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 Charity Tax Credits: 
Federal Policy and Three Leading States 
Executive Summary 
Margy Waller 
President George W. Bush proposes to expand charitable giving with state 
charity tax credits for donations to poverty-fighting programs by permitting states to pay 
for the cost of the credit (in lost revenue from taxes) with the state welfare block grant 
(Temporary Assistance to Needy Families).  “States would be encouraged to provide a 
credit (of up to 50 percent of the first $500 for individuals and $1,000 for married 
couples and corporations) against state income or other taxes for contributions to 
charities addressing poverty and its impact. States would be given the flexibility to offset 
the costs of a charitable state tax credit by using money from the Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF) program.”1  This paper considers whether such a policy 
would benefit low-income families, the communities where they live, and charities 
serving those families, by reviewing the history of charity tax credit proposals, surveying 
three leading states that have implemented the credits, and considering key questions. 
Earlier proposals for tax credits were packaged as part of the devolution 
revolution and welfare reform; current proposals are promoted as a way to increase 
support for faith-based and other community organizations or to alleviate poverty.  
However, all of these proposals share the common goal of shifting decision-making 
about how and where public resources are used to meet the needs of poor families from 
elected and appointed officials to individual taxpayers.  Consistently, supporters promote 
the credits as a way to let taxpayers take control of allocating tax dollars to meet social 
welfare needs of poor households. 
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An attempt to answer important questions for policy-makers reveals the need for 
study of existing state credits in places like Arizona, Michigan and North Carolina.  First, 
there is no empirical evidence that a charity tax credit increases charitable giving.  While 
claims for the credit increased each year in those three states, key contacts indicate there 
are reasons other than new giving to explain these increases.  For example, tax credits 
may be claimed by contributors who gave the same amount to anti-poverty programs in 
years before the credit was established, but each year more of these long-time 
contributors learn of and take the credit.  Study of the tax credits’ impact in states with 
existing credits should be the first step in any effort to design a national program. 
Second, shifting decisions about where to invest public anti-poverty funding 
from government to individuals eliminates the built-in accountability of public decision-
making.  The public officials responsible for social service programs have the advantage 
of surveying the broader system of community services.  They know the impact of other 
funding sources and where charitable giving has more capacity to meet community 
needs.  The job of these officials is to determine need and to assess the capacity of 
specific providers to meet that need.  They are accountable to the taxpayers, and can 
review performance outcomes pursuant to conditional grants and contracts.  If public 
funds are used to offset tax credits for funding decisions made by individuals, the 
accountability inherent in the competitive, performance-based system of public funding 
is lost.  It is surprising that the Bush administration would suggest a funding mechanism 
that eliminates accountability in government funding since President Bush has stated his 
commitment to performance-based grant making:  “We must be outcome-based, 
insisting on success and steering resources to the effective and to the inspired.”2 
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Third, high-poverty neighborhoods and the families who depend on social 
service providers in these neighborhoods would likely be losers with a funding 
mechanism like the state charitable tax credit proposed by the Bush administration.  In 
poor communities, the capacity to give is lower, and the dependence on funding streams 
like TANF by both providers and families is greater than in places less impacted by 
poverty.  If the administration’s tax credit proposal is enacted, resources that today are 
sent into the poorest communities could be redistributed to places with more wealth and 
less need.  
By the third month of the Bush administration, the charity tax credit proposal 
had not received much attention from the press or affected constituencies.  However, 
with the charitable choice proposal for increased direct federal funding of religious 
organizations under fire, a number of proponents of public funding for religious 
organizations have begun to point to the charity tax credit as a preferable alternative.  In 
fact, Don Eberly, now the deputy director of the White House Office of Faith-Based 
and Community Initiatives, wrote an essay during the 2000 campaign advising the next 
president that the tax credit is preferable to other means of expanding the role of 
nonprofits because it would “channel more funds to faith-based institutions” and would 
protect “the autonomy of charities, including faith-based ones, from state regulation and 
encroachment.”3   
In the months to come – including during the anticipated debate about 
reauthorization of TANF in 2002 – members of Congress should carefully consider the 
questions of whether the charity tax credit proposal would result in more charitable 
giving, and whether such an increase would be worth the loss of accountability and 
flexibility inherent in other uses of federal dollars.  The conclusion of this paper is that 
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more study of charity tax credits is necessary (and fortunately possible, since there are 
state experiments already underway) and that, no matter what design of the credit may be 
chosen, it is nevertheless unlikely that the proposal would be in the best interest of poor 
families and children. 
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President George W. Bush proposes to expand charitable giving with 
state charity tax credits for donations to poverty-fighting programs by permitting 
states to pay for the cost of the credit (in lost revenue from taxes) with the state 
welfare block grant (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families).  “States would 
be encouraged to provide a credit (of up to 50 percent of the first $500 for 
individuals and $1,000 for married couples and corporations) against state 
income or other taxes for contributions to charities addressing poverty and its 
impact. States would be given the flexibility to offset the costs of a charitable 
state tax credit by using money from the Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) program.”  
 
This paper addresses the question of whether President Bush’s charity tax credit 
proposal would enhance or weaken the set of services available to low-income families.  The 
paper includes a review of charity tax credit proposals (including pending federal proposals), 
a summary of characteristics of the legislation, a survey of tax credits in three leading states, 
and a list of questions about the policy that need to be answered before decision makers can 
determine whether the credit can enhance the ability of nonprofits to meet the needs of poor 
families and communities across the country. 
History of Federal Proposals 
  2
The case for a charity tax credit (CTC) has evolved over time.  Early proposals were 
packaged as part of the devolution revolution and welfare reform; current proposals are 
promoted as a way to increase support for faith-based and community organizations or to 
alleviate poverty.  However, all of them share the common goal of shifting decision making 
about how and where public resources are used to meet the needs of poor families from 
elected and appointed officials to individual taxpayers.  Consistently, supporters promote the 
credits as a way to let taxpayers take control of allocating tax dollars to meet social welfare 
needs of poor households. 
The charity tax credit has been proposed many times by members of Congress and 
various think tanks since the mid-1990s as part of the welfare reform debate.  Organizations 
like the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA), led by Pete DuPont, the Beacon Hill 
Institute for Public Policy Research at Suffolk University, and the National Center for 
Neighborhood Enterprise have supported a proposal to privatize welfare by allowing 
“individual taxpayers rather than politicians [to] decide how their share of the welfare bill 
would be spent by allocating their welfare dollars to any qualified charity.”5  
The NCPA proposal advocates a shift from individual entitlements and formula 
grants for “welfare” to state block grants.  Each federal taxpayer would have an established 
“share” of the federal welfare budget and could receive a one-dollar tax credit for each one-
dollar donation.  In turn, each state’s block grant would be reduced by one dollar for each 
dollar of tax credit claimed by a [taxpayer] resident of that state.  Taxpayers could claim the 
credit only for donations to a new category of qualified charities – charities that provide 
services to the poor.  The NCPA proposal suggested a state tax credit if the federal 
government failed to enact a federal credit.  A critical component of these proposals is that 
the option be revenue neutral.  Charity tax credits in these proposals were not intended to 
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increase charitable giving as much as they were supposed to shift allocation of public 
resources for welfare from elected and appointed officials to individual taxpayers.   
Indeed, the executive director of the Beacon Hill Institute (BHI) stated that the 
“economic argument for the tax credit is the same as for any form of privatization: to 
replace a government monopoly with a system of competing enterprises – in this instance, 
private, community-based charitable organizations – that vie with each other to provide 
better services at lower cost.”6  In 1995, BHI published a lengthy study on the tax credit, 
subtitled “A New Approach to Welfare Funding,” in which the authors proposed “… a 100 
percent tax credit for contributions to qualified organizations by individual taxpayers for up 
to 25 percent of their tax liability.”7  The study determined that the credit would “shift the 
delivery of up to $115 billion of federal means-tested benefits from government to private 
charities” and  “succeed in the principal goal of making welfare spending taxpayer controlled as well as 
taxpayer funded.”8 (Emphasis added.)   
Representatives Joe Knollenberg (R-MI) and Jim Kolbe (R–AZ) introduced the first 
charity tax credit legislation at the very beginning of the newly Republican 104th Congress 
on January 31, 1995.  The legislation called for the elimination of a large number of welfare 
and anti-poverty programs, replacing them with block grants to the states and a charity tax 
credit for taxpayers.  Rep. Knollenberg described the mechanism in his introductory 
remarks: “How should we reform the welfare delivery system? Our bill, like many others, 
would consolidate dozens of overlapping, inefficient Federal programs and put that money 
into a State block grant. However, it also provides for a choice-in-welfare tax credit that 
would give individual citizens a voice in how this country fights poverty. Under our plan, 
every taxpaying American would be free to direct up to 10 percent of their Federal income 
taxes to a charitable organization in their community that is engaged in antipoverty efforts. 
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Each time a taxpayer claimed this credit, the Federal Government would make a 
corresponding reduction in their State's block grant—thereby making it revenue neutral.”9   
Also that year, former Senator Dan Coats (R-IN) introduced federal charity tax 
credit legislation. Sen. Coats said:  “Can private charity replace Government? I am not 
suggesting that Federal, State and local governments will not have to be involved in poverty 
relief. But private initiatives can offer a viable alternative that the Government can at least 
encourage. I believe a charity credit will go a long way toward nurturing and encouraging 
those private efforts that I think are going to be more and more important as we begin to 
reform and reduce the scope of the Government involvement, because government alone simply has 
not worked for the well being of our people.”10  (Emphasis added.) 
In every Congress since then, members of Congress have proposed some form of 
charity tax credit.  Since the federal welfare legislation passed in 1996, the primary focus of 
charity tax credit proponents has been on promoting state charity tax credits rather than a 
federal credit.  
In 1998, the Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) was amended to permit the 
use of up to 10 percent of each state’s discretionary funds to offset losses from a state 
charity tax credit.  Representatives Mark Souder (R-IN) and Bobby Scott (D-VA) offered the 
amendment.  Rep. Souder said:  “We also have a bipartisan amendment with the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Scott) and myself that would allow at the State level their portion of 
Community Services Block Grant to be set aside to pay for State charitable credits.”  Rep. 
Souder described the state charitable credits as “an important breakthrough” because it 
provides an alternative to government assistance for those “who have been left behind in 
economic growth.”11  The charity tax credit incentive in CSBG is the only federal legislation 
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that has been signed into law to promote charity tax credits.  However, to date, no state has 
taken advantage of this option.  
In 1999, Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA) and former Rep. John Kasich (R-OH) 
introduced companion bills in the House and the Senate permitting states to offset up to 100 
percent of losses from a state charity tax credit with up to 50 percent of federal funds 
provided under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families block grant, the Child Care 
Development Fund, the Social Services Block Grant, the Community Services Block Grant, 
the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, the Job Training Partnership Act, and 
the Community Development Block Grant.  The bill would have permitted charity tax credit 
losses that exceeded the 50 percent cap to be counted toward the state’s TANF 
“maintenance of effort” requirement.12  At FY 2000 funding levels, the total available for 
state charity tax credits would have been nearly $27.4 billion. 
107th Congress and the 43rd President 
In 2001, Representatives Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) and Joe Knollenberg (R-MI) once again 
introduced a CTC bill.  Its title reflects the times: Eliminate Poverty Tax Credit Act of 2001.  
In the 107th Congress, welfare is mostly considered to have been reformed. Nationally, 
welfare caseloads have dropped nearly 60 percent since 1993, and millions of former welfare 
recipients have gone to work.  States have begun to use the flexible TANF block grant to 
support low income working families, without regard to their previous connection to the 
cash assistance program. Viable legislative proposals in this session are more likely to focus 
on alleviating poverty.  The new Kolbe/Knollenberg bill proposes a federal tax credit for 
charitable contributions to nonprofits providing services to the poor.  Significantly there is 
no offset for the credit, except that the existing tax deduction for the charitable contribution 
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would not be allowed.  In these days of budget surplus, it is no longer necessary to propose 
an offset for the credit.  To the sponsors, it is still preferable to allow individual taxpayers to 
decide how to spend the surplus, by giving them a charity tax credit, than to let federal 
officials spend it.13 
However, even without a specific offset, the tax credit policy in this bill is still 
intended to empower taxpayers by letting them make decisions about using tax collections to 
assist poor families.  In his letter to other members of the House, Rep. Kolbe says:  “When 
you fill out your tax forms this year, wouldn’t you like the opportunity to redirect $100 of 
your money that is headed to the federal bureaucracy and give it directly to an organization 
that is helping raise the standard of living of some of America’s poorest citizens? This bill 
makes every American an Appropriator. They can choose how to spend money that would 
normally be going to the IRS.”14 
Putting a new gloss on it, President George W. Bush has made his state charity tax 
credit proposal an element of his faith-based and community initiatives plan with the explicit 
goal of increasing charitable giving.  Yet, three months into his administration, and even 
after the introduction of bipartisan legislation to implement tax proposals from the President 
Bush’s Faith-Based and Community Initiatives plan in both houses of Congress, no member 
had proposed legislation to enact President Bush’s state charity tax credit incentive.15  
Legislation would be necessary because the proposed federal incentive to the states is the 
permission to offset lost revenue from the credit with the Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families block grant (TANF).  Limits on the use of TANF block grants prohibit giving these 
funds to taxpayers with enough household income to be eligible for a refund based on the 
credit.16 
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However, as the charitable choice provisions of the faith-based initiative continue to 
generate controversy, some advocates of funding for religious organizations are beginning to 
lobby for charity tax credits.  These supporters believe that credits avoid the constitutional 
problems inherent in direct funding of pervasively religious organizations.  One of the early 
promoters of this approach is Don Eberly, now the deputy director in the White House 
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, who has written that the tax credit is 
preferable to other means of publicly funding charities because it would generate more 
funding for religious organizations and would not subject those institutions to “state 
regulation and encroachment.” 17  Another prominent supporter of faith-based funding, 
Marvin Olasky, is a longtime advocate of charity tax credits.  Olasky has recently said he 
prefers tax incentives such as charity credits to direct funding mechanisms.18  Meanwhile, 
David Tuerck of Beacon Hill Institute plans an updated paper on charity tax credits and 
argues that just creating the credits without a reduction in federal spending is insufficient.  
Tuerck remains convinced that the purpose of the CTCs is to shift decisions about 
allocation of funding for welfare services from government to individual taxpayers, and to 
create a “competitive market” among nonprofits for welfare funding.  Finally, Tuerck 
believes that getting government out of the delivery system will mean that needy individuals 
must “find a charity that wants to provide” the necessary services, while taxpayers have to 
take an interest in service providers.19 
In sum, all of these proposals are reportedly made with the goal of reducing public 
spending on the poor, and to shift decision making from appointed and elected officials to 
individuals.  With the exception of President Bush’s proposal, there is very little reference to 
increasing contributions to charities serving the poor.  And there is almost never any 
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discussion of whether these proposals will enhance or weaken the set of services available to 
families in communities. 
Characteristics of the Charity Tax Credit Proposals  
Federal proposals for CTC, whether for a federal or state credit, and whether or not 
they include an offset to pay for the credit, share many characteristics in the definition of 
eligible “qualified charities”.  For example: 
1) Minimum expenditure requirement: Nonprofit expenditures on anti-
poverty programs must exceed a defined minimum, often 75 percent of annual 
organizational expenses. 
2) Expenditures:  Poverty program expenditures are usually defined to 
exclude spending on administration or management, influencing legislation, legal 
services, and fundraising. 
3) Poor individuals to be served:  Eligible poverty programs are only 
those serving households below a certain income level, usually between 150 
percent and 185 percent of the federal poverty level.  Some proposals create 
record keeping exceptions for shelter and feeding programs, assuming that 
individuals served in those programs will meet income eligibility criteria. 
Generally, the credit is for 50 percent to 100 percent of the contribution and is 
capped at a maximum of $50 to $500 for each taxpayer.   
Other provisions, not common to all proposals, include: 
· Permitting “solicitation organizations” like United Way to qualify as 
eligible charities under certain circumstances; 
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· Mandating new reporting requirements for eligible charities; for 
example, the percentage of organizational expenses for various categories of 
activities (e.g., fundraising, program, management, etc.); 
· Recommending that states limit qualified charities to those that have 
been operating for more than a year; 
· Recommending that states develop additional limits on legislative 
advocacy, legal services, voter registration, and public policy activities for 
qualified charities; and 
· Requiring study of the impact of the credit, including “the geographic 
distribution of the funding” and type of services funded by the credit, to 
determine whether the funding mechanism of the credits matches the services 
that would otherwise be provided by the federal funds “without the enactment 
of the reductions in the programs permitted” by the federal legislation.20 
 
 
A Survey of Charity Tax Credits in Three Leading States:  Arizona, Michigan 
and North Carolina 
Most surveys of state tax policy conclude that there are about 20 states that have 
enacted targeted tax credits for contributions to charitable organizations.21  However, most 
of these are for contributions to community economic development organizations, and they 
are sometimes limited to enterprise zones as well.22  This report will focus on three leading 
states: 
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· Arizona, because the credit is most like President Bush’s proposal 
and earlier federal proposals, since it is available specifically for charitable 
contributions to programs serving poor households;   
· Michigan, because the credit is for contributions to charities serving 
two poor populations:  the homeless and hungry; and,  
· North Carolina, because it is the only state that has taken a broader 
approach by creating a credit for contributions to all charities – not just those 
serving the poor. 
Arizona 
Arizona is the only state in the country to establish a tax credit like that proposed by 
the Bush administration.  The tax credit for contributions to charities that provide assistance 
to the working poor was enacted as part of the state’s welfare reform legislation in 1997.23   
The staff of the Valley of the Sun United Way  (Phoenix) believes that the credit was created 
to generate more charitable giving to nonprofits, which anticipated increased demand for 
assistance as a result of welfare reform policies.24  Working with state Rep. Mark Anderson 
(R- Mesa), the United Way and others supported a state credit that took effect in tax year 
1998.  Rep. Anderson recalls that he got the idea for this legislation after reading materials 
from the Beacon Hill Institute.25 In fact, Beacon Hill prepared a report entitled “A 
Charitable Tax Credit for Arizona” for the legislature recommending a tax credit that would 
maintain deficit neutrality by reducing “federal welfare spending … dollar-for-dollar with the 
increase in private giving” and a “five year phase out of the government welfare 
expenditures that the fully implemented credit is intended to replace.”26 However, the final 
legislation did not include an offset. 
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The Arizona credit is for cash contributions to a nonprofit organization spending at 
least 50 percent of its budget on services to households receiving TANF or with income 
below 150 percent of the federal poverty level.  The definition of services does not include 
the explicit limits on lobbying or legal services for the poor that are usually found in the 
federal legislation.  Community Action Agencies receiving CSBG funding are also eligible 
(although it does not appear that the state is using the option to offset the cost of the credit 
with CSBG discretionary funds).  A qualifying organization must certify that it meets all 
criteria for eligibility to the state Department of Revenue.   
A 100 percent credit of up to $200 is allowed for contributions above the amount 
contributed in the taxpayer’s baseline year.  The baseline year is the first year after 1995 that 
the taxpayer itemized charitable contributions.  Key contacts in the state recalled that the 
purpose of the baseline year requirement was to promote new giving to charities, rather than 
rewarding existing givers.  It was also intended to reduce the likelihood of the “substitution 
effect,” in which givers shift contributions from an ineligible charity to a qualified charity.  
Under the Arizona law, substitution could occur, but increased overall giving to nonprofits is 
required of the individual who takes the credit. However, no one has attempted an empirical 
study of the new credit to determine whether it has resulted in increased giving to eligible 
charities.   
The state can provide unverified, unofficial data regarding the number of filers who 
have claimed the credit and the total amount claimed.  For the two tax years, 1998 and 1999, 
less than 1 percent of filers claimed the credit.  In 1998, 2,183 filers claimed $385,890; in 
1999, 3,621 filers claimed $678,575.  Thus, the percentage of filers claiming the credit did 
increase in the second year, as did the average credit claimed.27 
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The Valley of the Sun United Way created a new fund that qualifies as an eligible 
charitable organization under the statute: the Helping the Working Poor Fund.  United Way 
fundraisers use the credit to market the fund, which is designed to make grants to nonprofits 
providing services to underemployed working poor individuals and their families.  The 
funded agencies compete for the award in an annual process conducted by United Way 
volunteers.  In this way the fund provides an option for taxpayers who want to be sure their 
contribution fills an identified community need and also ensures that outcomes are 
measured.   
The United Way fund has nearly doubled since it was created before the 1997 
fundraising campaign.  The staff attributes the growth in part to the fact that they market the 
fund with the tax credit.  However, the fund has received contributions in an amount nearly 
double the credits unofficially reported to have been claimed by taxpayers.  This may be 
because some contributors to the fund do not claim the credit, may not have increased their 
giving above the baseline year, or may not be itemizers.28 
Rep. Anderson was the chairman of the legislature’s Block Grants Committee and is 
currently chairman of the Human Services Committee, which has responsibility for oversight 
and legislation concerning the TANF block grant.  He stated that he would not support 
offsetting the cost of the credit with TANF as proposed by the Bush administration.29  
Although there has been no analysis of the impact of the credit on charitable giving in 
Arizona, the goal of the legislation seems to have been to increase giving – particularly in 
light of the anticipated additional demand on anti-poverty agencies as families lost welfare 
benefits. 
Michigan 
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Michigan’s credit for homeless shelters and food banks was also created at a time 
when social service providers felt burdened by demand created as a result of state policy 
changes. In 1991, Michigan passed legislation creating a new credit for 50 percent of a 
charitable contribution made to agencies whose primary purpose is to provide food or 
shelter to indigent persons.  The maximum credit is $100, or $200 for spouses filing a joint 
return.30  At about the same time, the state was significantly reducing funding for an 
entitlement program for emergency assistance and eliminating a program of cash assistance 
for unemployed childless adults.  Like the United Way in Arizona, homeless shelter and food 
bank operators in Michigan recognized the need for additional resources to cope with the 
increased demand resulting from the reduction in state funding – and they urged creation of 
the targeted tax credit.31 
The Michigan statute does not require the taxpayer to exceed contributions made in 
a baseline year – in fact, Michigan does not offer state deductions for charitable 
contributions at all.  Instead there are credits for targeted charitable contributions.  In 
addition to the homeless shelter and food bank credit, there are credits for contributions to 
community foundations and public institutions, e.g., universities, libraries, museums and 
public broadcasting stations.     
No one has analyzed the impact of this credit on charitable contributions.  However, 
Michigan Department of Treasury data show that the percentage of total income tax returns 
claiming the credit increases annually. The total homeless shelter and food bank credits 
claimed have increased from $3.3 million in 1992 (the first year of the credit) to $12.3 million 
in 1999 (the most recent data available). The amount of credits claimed has grown an 
average of 20.6 percent annually, with total growth of nearly 300 percent since the 1992 tax 
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year.  Treasury Department staff report that the amount of homeless shelter/food bank 
credits has a higher growth rate than Michigan’s other nonrefundable income tax credits.32 
 
 
North Carolina 
North Carolina is the only state in the nation to create a state tax credit for 
contributions to all nonprofits.  The credit is for contributions made by taxpayers who do 
not itemize their deductions and was intended to increase charitable giving – much as 
President Bush believes his proposal to extend the federal deduction for charitable 
contributions to nonitemizers will do.  
The North Carolina credit was created in 1996 and went into effect in 1997.33  It now 
permits nonitemizers to claim 7 percent of their charitable contributions above 2 percent of 
their adjusted gross income (AGI).  Supporters say the credit was designed to reward donors 
who contribute more than the average, which is about 2 percent of AGI. Until the 1999 tax 
year, the credit was for only 2.75 percent of the contribution; the percentage was increased 
by the legislature in 1998.  Legislators sponsoring the increase said they did so because the 
“state must do what it can to stimulate giving for the important work nonprofits do.”34   
The North Carolina Department of Revenue reports that the number of returns 
claiming the credit went from 88,560 in 1998 to 121,673 in 1999, while the total credits 
claimed increased from $3.3 million to nearly $12 million.  The total number of returns with 
taxable income remained at about 3 million in both years, so the percentage of filers claiming 
the return doubled from 2 percent to 4 percent. However, the numbers are not neatly 
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comparable because the percentage of a filer’s contributions eligible for the credit also 
increased from 2.75 percent to 7 percent between the two years.35  
Again, there has been no research to determine whether the credit – or the increase 
in the percentage in 1999 – has had an impact on charitable giving. 
The credit was advocated by the North Carolina Center for Nonprofits (NCCN) and 
its allies across the state.  The national organization Independent Sector (IS) provided 
technical assistance to NCCN on the development of the credit.36  Unlike the Arizona and 
Michigan charity credits, the North Carolina credit was not created as part of a change or 
reduction in public funding of social services.   
Lessons and Questions 
The review of policy goals for earlier federal CTC legislation and the state legislation 
in three leading states reveals some lessons and many questions for policymakers considering 
President Bush’s proposal.  While there are numerous ways to consider such a proposal, this 
paper focuses primarily on the question of how such a policy shift would impact poor 
families and children, services to those individuals, and the communities they live in.  
Attempts to answer important questions for policymakers reveal the need for more data and 
information about the impact of existing credits. 
Would the proposed CTC increase charitable giving to anti-poverty programs? 
President Bush’s proposal is intended “to stimulate additional charitable giving.”37  
The three states surveyed for this paper cannot provide empirical evidence that CTCs 
increase giving.  While the amounts claimed for the credit increased annually in each state, 
key contacts stated that there could be many explanations for the increase.  For example, 
increases may just reflect a new awareness of the credit by individuals who had previously 
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made annual contributions to an eligible charity without knowing about the credit.  In this 
case, the credit has not induced new giving but given an unexpected tax reduction to the 
donor.  The Arizona and North Carolina credit statutes attempt to address this possibility 
with provisions intended to reward new or above-average giving.   
The Arizona credit requires that the donor make contributions in excess of the 
baseline year.  However, this does not guarantee that the increase in overall giving is going to 
the eligible charity.  For example, the donor may increase giving to a university while keeping 
her contribution to an anti-poverty program at the same level.  She would still be eligible for 
the credit because her overall giving increased.  The North Carolina credit requires giving 
above 2 percent of adjusted gross income in order to claim the credit, to reward giving 
greater than the average household.  Still, a household that has always given above 2 percent 
of income would be rewarded without increasing giving at all. 
Despite the experimentation in these three states, there has been no study of the 
impacts on charitable giving.  A survey of the donors and eligible nonprofits about impacts 
in these three states would contribute knowledge critical to assessing whether President 
Bush’s goal could be achieved. 
Finally, the proposal would reduce TANF funding available to nonprofits in order to 
offset state revenue losses from the credit.  The administration’s budget indicates that states 
would have to reduce funding for existing TANF funded programs (like child care and 
transportation assistance) over time if states used the block grant to pay for the increasing 
cost of the credit.38  As a result, nonprofit providers question the advantage of increasing 
charitable giving (if the credit actually did that) when it would simply be offset by reductions 
in public funds.39  In fact, it is possible that the credit could result in a net loss of funds for 
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anti-poverty programs.  This would happen if the credit does not stimulate additional giving 
to social service providers and taxpayers claim credits for their existing level of giving 
because the public funds currently available for grants to these nonprofits would still be 
reduced to cover the state’s lost revenue. 
 Who should determine and be accountable for the allocation of federal dollars dedicated to assisting 
poor families – government officials or taxpayers?    
There is an assumption built into most federal proposals for CTCs, and 
Congressman Knollenberg says it well when he suggests making “every American an 
appropriator.”  The arguments made by supporters of the CTC mechanism for funding anti-
poverty or welfare services suggest that individual taxpayers will know best which local 
charity should be funded, urging further devolution of welfare reform – all the way down to 
the individual.  David Tuerck of Beacon Hill Institute argued that this “privatization” of 
welfare services would require the individual taxpayer to pay attention to the effectiveness of 
nonprofit service providers. 
While it may be true that increased charitable giving would result in some additional 
scrutiny of nonprofits by donors, this argument overlooks the importance of the role of 
elected and appointed officials.  The public officials responsible for social service grant 
programs have the advantage of surveying the broad system of community services.  They 
know the other public funding sources and where charitable giving has more capacity to 
meet community need.  The job of these officials is to determine need and to assess the 
capacity of providers to meet that need.  They are accountable to the taxpayers, and can 
review performance outcomes pursuant to conditional grants and contracts.  If public funds 
are used to offset tax credits for funding decisions made by individuals, the accountability 
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inherent in the competitive, performance-based system of public funding is lost.  
Interestingly, the importance of auditing for results of public investment is a major of focus 
of the Bush administration charitable choice initiative to let religious organizations deliver 
more social programs with existing federal funds.  Thus, President Bush’s proposal seems, 
on the one hand, to recognize the importance of government oversight, and, on the other, to 
dismiss it with the use of TANF funds offsetting charity tax credits. 
Mostly, arguments for CTCs view the world through the eyes of the taxpayer.  What 
if we consider the proposal from the perspective of the nonprofit?  Generally, nonprofit 
providers of social services receiving public funding must compete on an annual basis for a 
grant or contract.  Increasingly, organizations must also report results and meet performance 
goals in order to be eligible to compete the following year. Nonprofit managers do not 
object to a competitive marketplace for funding.   
However, nonprofits have tight budgets.  They cannot carry over funds from year to 
year or their funders will object.  This is especially true for the small, community and faith-
based organizations that President Bush seeks to support.  Thus, nonprofits need to be 
assured of a certain cash flow, some nearly guaranteed income.  Depending on charitable 
contributions encouraged through tax credits while losing a TANF contract is not an easily 
managed budget scenario for the small nonprofit operator.   
Marcia Hopp-Newman, executive director of Downtown Neighborhood Learning 
Center in Phoenix, said she’d much rather give up the charity tax credit than lose the block 
grant funding she depends on to run her programs.  She describes the proposal to offset 
credits with other public funds as a “shell game.”  However, she has found the Arizona tax 
credit – with its requirement to increase giving above a baseline year, and dollar-for-dollar 
  19
reduction in state taxes – to be an effective marketing tool for her center.  In addition, she 
points out that the flexibility of the unrestricted funding from charitable donations is hard to 
get from public or foundation funding.40  
One of President Bush’s frequent arguments for tax cuts has been that taxpayers 
know better how to spend their tax dollars than policymakers do.  Senate Minority Leader 
Daschle has responded in this way: "I really defy someone to say you can spend that money 
in fire protection or law enforcement better if you were doing it yourself than if you did it 
collectively."41  The same response can apply to the design, funding and monitoring of 
assistance to poor households. 
How would the credit impact funding mechanisms designed to match resources to need?   
Federal anti-poverty and welfare programs were created in part because poor 
communities were not able to provide services based solely on ability to collect local taxes or 
charitable contributions.  Congress has developed complex funding formulas based on 
assessment of need.  Within states, TANF funds are distributed based on elected and 
appointed officials’ conclusions about how best to address need across the state.  President 
Bush’s proposal would shift the distribution of TANF from a method that involves 
assessment of the entire state system to one that is based on capacity and willingness to 
make charitable contributions.   
Research conducted by Julian Wolpert of Princeton University suggests that the 
geography of giving would not correlate to need.  In “What Charity Can and Cannot Do,” a 
report for the Twentieth Century Fund, Wolpert finds that almost all charitable 
contributions are made and spent locally.  People give where they live.  Yet, need does not 
necessarily correlate to willingness or capacity to give.  Except in cases of a natural disaster, 
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like a flood or earthquake, or other emergency attracting widespread media attention, most 
charitable giving does not get reallocated across communities.  In addition, across states 
there are differences in how much individuals are willing to donate, and the nonprofit efforts 
they favor.  Wolpert concludes that “philanthropy would be a limited and uneven 
supplement to the government safety net” and that charities in central cities “find that the 
need for their assistance increases in proportion to their inability to raise funds.”42  
High-poverty neighborhoods and the families who depend on social service 
providers in those neighborhoods would likely be losers with a funding mechanism like the 
state charitable tax credit proposed by the Bush administration.  In poor communities, the 
capacity to give is lower, and the dependence on funding streams like TANF by both 
providers and families is greater than in places less impacted by poverty.  If the 
administration’s proposal is enacted, resources that today are sent into the poorest 
communities could be redistributed to places with more wealth and less need. 
The geography of giving would be relevant to any CTC proposal, whether or not it 
permits offsetting revenue losses with public funds.  Spending taxes collected as a charitable 
credit to taxpayers reduces the flexibility of elected appropriators to meet needs across states 
and communities.   
*** 
No doubt there are other questions that should be asked. If the particular charity tax 
credit creates new compliance requirements for eligible charities, there would be a question 
about the capacity of states and nonprofits to monitor and adhere to new regulations.  Many 
nonprofits have objected to proposals that create a  “hierarchy among charities … such that 
charities that serve the poor directly are given a special status, while those which focus on 
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worker safety or civil rights or the environment, or that work internationally rather that 
domestically, are relegated to a secondary status.”43  Also, anti-poverty policy advocates 
object to legislation that is drafted in such a way as to discourage lobbying and legal services 
on behalf of poor families.  Many service providers and advocates see these measures as 
critical options on the menu of activities to reduce poverty.   
To address these questions, a study of the impact of a charity tax credit on charitable 
giving, state flexibility, and nonprofit administration could begin right away in any one or all 
of the three states surveyed in this report. 
Legal Issues 
TANF statute:  The statute would have to be amended to allow states to use the 
block grant to offset revenue losses from charity tax credits.  First, all federal funds must be 
spent on activities reasonably calculated to accomplish one of the statute’s purposes.  
Although the statute has broad purposes, families with enough income to be eligible for tax 
credits would not be “needy families,” as required.  Second, use of TANF for tax credits is 
limited to the refundable portion of refundable credits (where the taxpayer is entitled to the 
full credit even when the amount of the credit exceeds  
her tax liability), when the tax credit is designed to accomplish one of the TANF purposes.  
Charity tax credits are not refundable in this proposal, or any earlier federal proposal.44  
First Amendment:  Groups that monitor government involvement with religious 
organizations are likely to disagree about the constitutionality of charity tax credits offset by 
public funds.  However, there is no question that some of the CTCs’ most vocal supporters 
see credits as a way to get more funds to religious organizations.  Don Eberly, now the 
deputy director of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, wrote 
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an essay during the 2000 campaign advising the next president that the tax credit is 
preferable to other means of expanding the role of nonprofits because it would “channel 
more funds to faith-based institutions” and protects “the autonomy of charities, including 
faith-based ones, from state regulation and encroachment.”45  Marvin Olasky, one of 
President Bush’s most influential advisers on these issues during the campaign, has 
repeatedly indicated that tax credits are preferable to direct funding of faith-based 
organizations. 
Supporting and Opposing Organizations 
An informal survey of organizations that monitor and lobby on welfare and anti-
poverty policy reveals that very few groups have established a formal position on the 
administration’s proposal for charity tax credits.  Nonprofits have been largely preoccupied 
with other proposals in President Bush’s faith-based initiative.  Most of the attention and 
energy has been applied to the questions of whether religious organizations should receive 
direct funding from the government, nonitemizers should get a federal charitable deduction, 
and the estate tax should be eliminated.  Of course, the impact of proposed income tax cuts 
have also been a matter of considerable focus by anti-poverty groups.   
Nevertheless, two large and significant national organizations have taken positions 
opposing charity tax credits. 
Independent Sector recently issued a statement opposing President Bush’s targeted 
tax credit. The national organization supports “the critical need to increase giving to charities 
that serve the poor, but oppose[s] charity tax credits as a means to accomplish this goal. 
Charity tax credits would inappropriately insert government tax policy into the private giving 
choices of individual Americans, would increase regulation, and could reduce the net flow of 
resources to organizations addressing poverty.”46  Sara Melendez, president of IS, has said 
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she objects to the use of welfare funds as an offset for charity tax credit costs in the states.  
"It is robbing Peter to pay Paul," she said.47  Meanwhile, IS supports a broader approach to 
increasing charitable giving:  allowing nonitemizers to take a federal deduction for all charitable 
contributions.48 Emphasis added. 
United Way of America (UWA) has also stated that it does not support charity tax 
credits because the policy “could have unintended consequences for the network of 
community based organizations which support human services as well as for the people and 
communities they serve.”  The issue statement indicates that UWA will not support 
proposals that displace existing funding or treat charitable donations differently depending 
on the subset of charities they benefit.  UWA also supports tax proposals that increase 
overall charitable giving, and notes that there is no evidence that charity tax credits would do 
so.49 
Groups supporting the charity tax credit policy (though not necessarily President 
Bush’s specific proposal) include Acton Institute, Beacon Hill Institute, and the National 
Center for Policy Alternatives.  These are all think tanks that have been supporters and 
promoters of the CTC for several years. 
Conclusion 
President Bush’s proposal to increase charitable giving by promoting state charity tax 
credits is not in the best interest of low-income children and families.   The credits are 
purportedly expected to increase charitable giving to “charities addressing poverty and its 
impact.”  Yet, there is no evidence that tax credits would increase giving, and every reason to 
expect that the particular design of the credit program would significantly impact the 
chances of achieving that outcome.  Charitable giving experience indicates that programs in 
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communities with the greatest need would receive the least in contributions. People give 
where they live, and poor communities would be losers in a system that depends on 
charitable giving to support community needs.  Finally, because the federal incentive for the 
credit is to allow states the use of an existing anti-poverty funding stream to offset the cost 
of the credit to the state treasuries, charities, poor communities, and families should be wary.  
Block grant funds that are sent to the poorest communities today could be reallocated to 
communities with the greatest capacity for charitable giving, if not the greatest need for 
services.  
Further, President Bush’s own budget numbers acknowledge that states would have 
to reduce funding for services like child care and transportation assistance to pay for the 
credits.   Congressional decision makers and others concerned about the impact of policy on 
children and families, communities, and charities, should not accept the tax credit proposal 
on faith, but instead urge study of existing state charity tax credits and consider carefully any 
proposal that substitutes an unregulated, unmonitored system of publicly financed support 
for one that comes with rational spending formulas and the oversight of government 
officials.  Loss of the accountability inherent in competitive grant and contract programs 
from government is one of the great ironies of this proposal from a president who says:  
“The paramount goal must be compassionate results, not compassionate intentions. … We 
must be outcome-based, insisting on success and steering resources to the effective and to 
the inspired.”  Chances are, that’s something all concerned agree with.  But, as always – and 
even in a faith-based initiative – the devil is in the details. 
 
Margy Waller is the former Senior Advisor for Welfare and Working Families at the White House 
Domestic Policy Council. 
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